This paper deals with the relation between trade and development when poverty affects individual decision making. We develop a twosector model that links production and schooling decisions under poverty with standard neo-classical trade analyses. The decision to either work or acquire skills depends on households having reached subsistence levels of income, implying that the income level of a country becomes important in establishing comparative advantages and trade patterns. Trade liberalisation is always allocative efficient, but its timing is im portant for the speed by which countries industrialise as well as for global efficiency. Our analysis support the idea that there are in stances that stalling trade liberalisation may serve poverty alleviation and global efficiency at the same time.
In tro d u ctio n
Ever since Adam Smith wrote his groundbreaking The Wealth of Nations, economists have debated the desirability of international trade. In this dis cussion, opponents have continuously brought in numerous specific cases in which free trade might not be desirable. Many of these convincing cases notwithstanding, this focus on exceptions has in a way only served to confirm the general rule th at free trade is beneficial under 'normal' circumstances.
W ith "the case for free trade (thus being) settled" in principle (Bhagwati et al., 1998) , the economic debate has shifted towards specification of what circumstances could still count as normal.
A particularly persistent line of critique in this respect is that traditional trade theory has no attention for the specific problematic situation of devel oping societies. Being poor, lacking industrialisation and facing competition from economies in a much more advanced stage of development are not the normal circumstances for which the case for free trade has been settled. Ac cording to this argument, the poor need a special trade economics, as well as different policies than the liberal ones suggested by conventional trade theory. Such sentiments have fuelled protests at various WTO summits in recent years, and to some extent have contributed to the collapse of the cur rent Doha-round. Theoretically, these dissent voices have been propped up by economic historians and development economists claiming that late-comer development requires industrialization under government protection and sup port, before subjecting economic sectors to the discipline of the market (e.g. Amsden 1989; Wade 1990) .
Regardless of whether one is willing to subscribe to this argumentation to abandon free trade policies for poor societies, the pervasiveness of the cri tique warrants economics to confront the argument and address the impact of poverty upon trade patterns. This paper aims at doing so. We develop a framework in which poverty co-determines comparative advantage, and use it to verify the desirability of trade in relation to issues like allocative efficiency and development. In particular, we develop a two-sector model th at links production and schooling decisions under poverty with standard neo-classical trade analysis. The decision to either work in agriculture or to acquire skills needed for manufacturing is modelled to depend on house holds having reached a certain minimum, subsistence level of income. Apart from the influence of nature-given comparative advantages, also the income level of countries is then im portant in establishing comparative advantage.
Over time, reductions in poverty might shift trade patterns and the verdict on the desirability of trade becomes dependent on the timing of trade lib eralisation as well as on the perspective taken. Our analysis suggests that whereas trade is always desirable if one focuses on short-term allocative effi ciency, temporary protection might be preferred because of dynamic effects on industrialization and development.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 further motivates our set-up by discussing the potential impact of poverty on labour supply and production decisions on a micro-level, and trade and development on the macro-level. Section 3 subsequently constructs a formal model th at takes these insights into account, which is used in Sections 4 and 5 to discuss the implications of including poverty over time for, respectively, the accumulation of training and comparative advantage. Section 6 discusses the desirability of trade in our poverty-ridden framework and Section 7 concludes.
W h y P o v erty m a tters
The critique on standard neo-classical models of international trade that they do not take into account the disadvantaged starting position of poor countries demands some clarification. Trade theory, and specifically compar ative advantage models, in fact do address the consequences of differences between countries engaging in international trade. Indeed, such differences are the prime source of trade and welfare gains in these models. However, differences between countries considered only apply to endowments or tech nology, and are treated as 'givens' rather than as consequences of the level of development at a given time. The underlying assumption is that economic mechanisms apply universally, regardless of development level or context. In other words, comparative advantage models are not based upon micro-level analysis of specific consequences of making economic decision under condi tions of poverty.
The sub-discipline of development economics, however, gives arguments why economies might operate differently under poverty than under relative affluence. The literature about efficiency wages provides a good example (e.g. Dasgupta 1997 ). The implications of such work for trade theory are serious.
If decision making under poverty differs from decision making under affluence, economic actions will be dependent upon outcomes of previous actions, and thus to some extent endogenous1. Hence, the behavioural assumptions on which standard trade models are founded in that case are too static and too simplistic to be instrumental for analysing the welfare effects of trade.
In order to come up with an alternative, a micro-analysis of the circum stances under which the poor produce is warranted. A main characteristic of situations of poverty is th at individuals are directly confronted not with one, as in usual neoclassical theory, but with two budget constraints. On the one hand, it is impossible to consume more than one earns. On the other hand, it is impossible to consume less than a certain minimum needed for survival.
This simple fact has im portant consequences for the labour supply decision of the individual, which are depicted in Figure 1 . 1For example, efficiency wage theory shows th a t self-reinforcing income differences may occur between initially identical individuals (Dasgupta, 1997) . A similar idea is endorsed by Sen who regards development as an increase in freedoms or entitlem ents (Sen, 1999) . T he corollary of this idea is th a t lack of development means a lack of freedoms and capa bilities, which will make decision making qualitatively different. She weighs this against the opportunity cost of training, which is the wage to be earned on the labour market. In the figure, this is represented by the slope of the budget lines wzLmax, for z = A ,B ,C . These budget lines give, for each level of training that is physically possible (L < Lmax), the income level attainable at the prevailing wage rate. Normally, the optimising labourer will choose a 'consumption' basket of training and income such that the marginal costs of training equal the marginal benefits, that is: where the budget line is tangent to the highest indifference curve possible. Point B and C indicate such points. Below the wage associated with point B, however, optimisation means to work until income reaches the level of consumption minimally required to sustain the household (the horizontal line Emin), while spending the rest of time on training. The low wage prevents the labourer from choosing the desired combination of training and work, resulting in a lower than desired rate of training. For instance, for wage Wa, the optimum choice would be A0, yet the labourer must choose A to stay at a subsistence level of income. In the presence of poverty, therefore, the training expansion path is depicted by the bold solid line in the figure. Up until point B, any rise in the wage rate will increase the possibilities for training, and, thereby the level of it. It is the room for training that determines how much labourers train, not their preferences. At wages above wB, however, they are not longer constrained by the need to survive and the level of training is determined by the normal marginal cost-benefit analysis. Under such conditions, the optimal level of training will be lower than upon subsistence, though at wage levels high enough training may increase again. This leads to the 'bend' in the training expansion p ath .2
The relevance of this analysis is that for an individual constrained by poverty, it will be rational to limit labour supply once earnings go up, since more room is created to invest in training. This implies that, ironically 2T h at is, we implicitly assume th a t the wages just above subsistence are not high enough to lead to a situation in which higher wages lead to a lowering of the number of hours worked. The latter phenomenon is a well-known possibility in the literature on labour markets, where it leads to the backward bending p art of the individual labour supply curve. Our assum ption seems reasonable in light of the fact th a t backward bending supply curves are usually considered to occur in situations of relative affluence. enough, the individuals earning the highest wages when supplying untrained labour will be the ones deciding to work least and train most. In other words, if training would yield the same higher income for all individuals, those with the least incentive to train will decide to train most. This only changes when wages rise above subsistence levels. Then standard neoclassical trade off decisions apply, giving rise to a negative relation between (current) wages and time devoted to training.
On a macro-level, this has important implications for the development of societies. If we take the development of society as a process of industri alisation coupled with increasing labour productivity, the level of training becomes central to the pace of economic growth. Training is required for untrained labour to engage in manufacturing and to become more produc tive. Therefore, a society in which more people devote more of their time to training instead of earning direct income will develop faster. If the amount of time devoted to training relates positively to current income, it follows th at relatively affluent societies will develop a vaster stock of trained labour, fostering industrialisation. If such a country subsequently engages in trade with a poorer country th at assigned less time to training, it will have de veloped a comparative advantage in manufacturing goods and export these goods accordingly.
The interesting aspect of this is that the comparative advantage in man ufactured goods arises precisely because the richer country was more pro 3This pattern also has clear historical antecedents. Industrial and commercial centres typically emerged either at locations where the soil was fertile enough to boost large populations not directly engaged in food production, or where particularly favorable water routes made it possible to im port food from other regions, such as the cases of Venice, the
A Form al M o d el o f P o v e rty and T raining
To verify the consequences of poverty-based training decisions at the house hold level on aggregate variables in a more formal manner, we model the economy of a potentially poor country as producing two goods by means of the production factors land and labour. The quantity and quality of land is fixed throughout the analysis. Labour, in contrast, is not homogeneous but consists of two qualities: trained and untrained labour. Initially, all labour is of the untrained quality but this can change over time as individuals might become trained. Untrained labour is an input to the production of a ho mogeneous, agricultural product F (from Food), which also takes land as an input. Trained labour is the sole production factor for producing a variety of manufactured goods M. Food is characterised by decreasing returns to scale (as the quantity of land is fixed over time, whereas the quantity of un trained labour is not). For the production of manufactured goods we assume increasing returns to scale at the firm level.
To formalise training decisions, we start by assuming th at per period each individual has a certain amount of time available for working and/or training and we normalise this to one. This time is devoted to working (for trained individuals) or for working and/or training (for untrained individ uals). Next we assume th at the decision how much to train is based on a comparison between current wages foregone and the net present value of the increment in wages that result from being trained, except when such amount of training would yield a wage income below subsistence. Then the time devoted to training is such th at it allows individuals to survive, leaving them a subsistence level of income. Consequently, above subsistence the decision to become trained labour is based upon the desire for training. 'At subsis tence' it is the room for training th at determines time allotted to training.
Finally, we must aggregate individual training levels. In our analysis being a trained or untrained individual is a dichotomous affair: one works either in the untrained agricultural sector or in the trained manufacturing sector. For aggregation, this would imply -given an initially homogeneous labour force Black Sea and Holland (Cipolla 1980, 75-6) .
-th at all labourers would devote the same time to training, simultaneously becoming trained enough to enter the manufacturing sector. This is not a very plausible way of aggregating individual decisions. Therefore, we first aggregate individual training activities and use th at to determine how many trained individuals arise. One way to view this is that training efforts can be 
where T denotes the share of time per period devoted to training, while w and r denote wage rates for untrained and trained labour, respectively.4
The superscript 'S ' is used to distinguish training levels at subsistence. The parameter 0 < p < 1 denotes the individual's time preference and Emin is the minimum subsistence level of expenditures. There are no tuition fees.
By choice of units, we set the total number of individuals in society equal to one. Denoting untrained individuals with L and trained individuals with H , this implies th at at any point of time:
The transformation of individual training activities into trained individuals 4The expression features nominal wage rates, where real wage rates would be due. However, in (1), the price index drops out. is governed by: affect labour input disproportianally. For instance, given that the untrained 5 The above subsistence training decision implies th a t individuals are myopic, perceiv ing current wage differentials to persist forever. It can be shown, however, th a t (1) is also consistent with static forward-looking expectations (see Baldwin et al., 2003, Section 2.B.4). Moreover, it is intuitively plausible: untrained labour bases its decision to become trained or not on the profitability of doing so. labourer learns, this could positively affect the efficacy of labour input (even though the training does not directly apply to food production). By con trast, training may require more effort and energy than the hours devoted to it, decreasing labour input by more than the time it takes. In any case, we assume th at the individual takes the value of £ as given, while in our analysis we will typically apply £ = 1 -T as a plausible benchmark. Once trained, individuals fully engage in directly productive activities, implying th at H also denotes the amount of trained labour available for the manufacturing sector.
Wages of untrained labour are determined in de food sector. Food is produced by land and untrained labour and since the pile of arable land is given and fixed, its production entails decreasing returns. Specifically, we assume F = A £ (5) with 0 < ft < 1 indicating decreasing returns to scale and where A is a positive constant denoting fertility of land. Since food is a homogeneous product, we choose it as numeraire setting its price to one throughout the analysis (pF = 1). The wage income of untrained individuals is then equal to their marginal productivity:
Trained labour is the sole production factor of manufactures. The manu facturing sector is monopolistically competitive and faces increasing returns to scale.6 Specifically, the production of a variety of the manufactured good amr p = r r v a <7)
Assuming free entry and exit in the manufacturing sector implies that profits will be driven to zero, so that, in equilibrium x = f (a -1)/am and Hx = a f .
Since trained labour is only used in manufacturing, this implies that the total number of varieties in the economy is implicit in the full employment condition for trained labour:
Consumption is divided over food and the composite of manufactured goods in a Cobb-Douglas way, while the demand for varieties entails standard Dixit-Stiglitz love of variety. Denoting the total number of varieties available by N , we get:
where 0 < ^ < 1 denotes the expenditure share on manufactured goods and where a > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties as well as the price elasticity of demand. CM and CF denote, respectively, the consumption of the manufacturing composite and food. Utility maximisation implies th at a share of the individual's income is spent on manufactured goods and a share 1 -p on food.
All individuals divide their income over food and manufactures in the same way, irrespective of training and income levels.8 Accordingly, we can the same across varieties. 8T h at is, we assume identical and hom othetic preferences. Though perhaps unfitting for an analysis th a t centers around poverty as key determ inant for decision making, we depict consumption levels as a function of aggregate income I as follows:
Total income in the economy consists of what is earned in manufacturing and food production. Recalling that there are zero profits in manufacturing and assuming th at rents (due to the presence of decreasing returns to scale in agriculture) are redistributed among the entire population9, we get:
All income is spent on food and manufactures. Wages foregone due to train ing are implicit in £ , while there are also no tuition fees.
In autarky, the ratio of total earnings in manufacturing and agriculture must equal the ratio of expenditure shares. Hence, equilibrium requires that:
where we used (11) to determine CM/C F. Substituting the equilibrium firm size in this equation and rearranging gives the wage rate for trained labour as a function of H :
We are now in the position to determine the amount of training when the income of untrained labour is above subsistence. Substituting (6) and (13) apply it to m aintain focus on the relation between poverty, training decisions and com parative advantage. Moreover, it keeps results tractable, for which reason homothetic preferences is also the standard assum ption in trade theory. See, however, M atsuyam a (2000) and Stibora and de Vaal (2007) for a treatm ent of nonhom othetic preferences in a trade theoretic framework. 9 The land rents are equal to food production minus what is paid to untrained labour, hence (1 -[i)w£/[j. Our assum ption th a t land rents are redistributed to the whole pop ulation implies th a t initially, when all individuals are untrained, each untrained labourer is also owner of land and th a t this does not change when individuals become trained. in (1) yields,
In other words, above subsistence the amount an individual trains is a declining function of the amount of labour that has already been trained (dT/dH < 0, taking £ as given At subsistence, it is the room for training that determines how much an individual trains, as given by (2). Applying the equilibrium wage rate for untrained labour, the amount of training is:
At subsistence, therefore, the time individuals devote to training increases with the share of trained labour in society, at an increasing rate (dTS/d H > 0, d2T S/d H 2 > 0 for given £). As transformation is based on the possibilities for training, training increases when the income of untrained labour rises, which is the case as more labour becomes trained. When the wage rate is [insert Figure 2 about here]
T raining as tim e g o es by
When the amount of trained labour in the economy increases, our model indicates th at individual training levels increase when the economy is at subsistence, while training levels decrease when the economy is above sub sistence. Which situation applies is most easily determined by comparing the outcomes of training decisions under either regime. If T S > (<) T , then untrained labour is apparently above (at) subsistence as the room for train ing is equal or higher (lower) than the desired levels of training. In terms of Figure 2 , the true function of T would therefore be indicated by the bold curve.
The value of H for which the regime switch occurs is implicit in:
11Though technically feasible, it makes no sense to allow for w = Em¡n at positive levels of H as then positive H could never have been reached.
It can be shown th at H is unique and th at it always lies between zero and one.12 By applying the implicit function theorem it is easy to see that dH/ dA < 0 and dH /dEmin > 0. If land is more fertile or when subsis tence levels of expenditure are lower, there is more room for training and the economy reaches its above subsistence state faster. The extent by which training reduces effective labour supply in agriculture also has an impact. If £ goes up, it takes longer before the economy reaches the above subsistence state (dH/d£ > 0). A higher £ means th at effective labour supply in food production goes up, implying a lower wage level for the untrained individual and less room for training.
The im portant point to be noted, however, is that the transition from one state to another is not as smooth as indicated in Figure 2 1.75, p = ft = 0.6, p = 0.9, C = 0.1, am = 0.5 and f = 1, increasing H from zero and one with 0.01 increments.13 Moreover, we set £(T) equal to 1 -T .
To operationalise myopic behaviour, we assume that optimal training levels for a certain value of H depend on the wages of the previous value of H . (4), we get Above subsistence Ultimately the accumulation of trained labour stops, which we will refer to as the economy's steady state. Since untrained labour always gets above subsistence at some level of H < 1 -if H ! 1, w goes to infinity-it follows th at the steady state level of H is determined by setting C • (1 -Ht) • Tt = 0.
By (18) we calculate th at the economy reaches a steady state a t:14
which indeed coincides with the threshold level H beyond which individual training levels are zero. We note that the steady state level of H is indepen dent of A, the fertility of land.
The oscillation patterns th at affected individual training levels when H
progressed also influence the accumulation of trained labour. is low enough.16 The fact th at H ultimately reaches zero is consistent with 14We note th a t a second steady state equilibrium exists, which occurs when even at H = 0 wages are at subsistence. Then w -Em¡n = 0 also implies a positive steady state level of H . It is however im mediately clear th a t this is a theoretical possibility only, as supposedly any economy has started at some point in tim e w ithout any am ount of trained labour (hence positive H could never have been reached). The limiting case when w -E min = 0 at H = 0 is possible though, but highly unstable. Any rise in H leads to an upward spiral until income is above subsistence level and, subsequently, the stable steady state equilibrium is reached.
15 In contrast to Figure 3 [insert Figure 4 about here]
P o v erty -in d u ced C om p arative A d v an ta g e
In this section we uses our model to verify the implications of poverty on comparative advantage. We assume th at the world consists of two regions, North and South, th at are initially exactly similar, except that North has more fertile land at its disposal than South. Using asterisks to denote south ern variables, A > A* throughout the analysis.
In our model, comparative advantage is given by the relative price of manufactures over food. W ith food being numeraire, the relative price of manufactured goods is given by (7) . Using (13) to substitute for r, we get: For the South an isomorphic equation applies for p*. The comparative ad vantage of both countries is given by p/p*. If p/p* > (<) 1, we say that North has a comparative advantage in food (manufactures). If the two countries individuals into trained labour appraoches one. The reduction in untrained labour as well as the reduction in desirability of getting trained during the first period is so large th a t the economy immediately swithches to the above subsistence state and remains there forever.
are completely identical, except for the fertility of land, we get:
where we have implemented p = p*, a = a* and am = a*m . To see more clearly how poverty determines comparative advantage, we verify the conditions under which comparative advantage shifts when coun tries start at equal, initial amounts of trained labour (H = H *) and concomi-17 The literature on endogenous comparative advantage tries to explain how comparative advantages evolve when there are no inherent differences between agents, see Yang and Ng (1998) for an overview. In addition, the relation between exogenous comparative advantage and endogenous comparative advantage has received attention, for instance by establishing conditions under which initial exogenous comparative advantages may change. An early and seminal contribution is Yang (1994) . tant individual training levels (so that C(T) = C(T*)). If countries are both above subsistence level, then also the accumulation of trained labour is the same. Above subsistence, training decisions are independent of A , see (14) .
H and H * follow identical paths over time, leaving comparative advantage unchanged. If, however, both countries are at subsistence, things change dra matically. When the initial amount of trained labour is equal, say close to zero, the room for training is higher in the North. Accumulation of trained labour goes faster in the North than in the South, declining N orth's relative price of manufactures. In fact, it can be shown that comparative advantage will shift in the first period th at training occurs (so in period one).18 Having more fertile land implies a comparative advantage in manufactures at the beginning of the first period after which training could occur.
We illustrate the development of comparative advantage over time for two different values of ft in Figure 5 , again using our benchmark parameter constellation. As expected, comparative advantage shifts right away, to even tually return to its nature given ordering. The reasoning is as before. In the initial situation, where both countries have zero trained labour, the room for training is higher in the North. H accumulates faster than H *, shifting initial comparative advantages. North however also reaches the point where income gets above subsistence faster, declining the incentive for training (while in the South the room for training still increases). Consequently, from that point onward p/p* will go up again. This continues when South surpasses its subsistence level of income. In both countries the price of manufactures falls, but as South is further away from steady state, prices in South fall more rapidly than in the North. As both countries reach the same steady state -H is independent of A -eventually comparative advantage retains its initial ordering again.
The overall picture is invariant to the value ft. A lower value of ft shifts the 18During period 1 training levels are [1 -E min/^A ] for N orth and [1 -Em-ln/pA*] for South, am ounting to H = C [1 -E m;n/^A ] and H * = C [1 -E m;n/^A*] at the beginning of period 2. Using this in (21) and assuming C(T) = 1 -T and C(T *) = 1 -T *, shows th a t the relative price of m anufactures in period 2 is smaller th an A /A * (which was the initial relative price). Taking the derivative of the relative price with respect to A and evaluating it for A = A*, yields d (p/p*) /dA < 0. Hence, during period 1, p/p* falls and becomes lower th an one. curve downward and prolongs the time it takes for South to retain its nature given comparative advantage in manufactures. The reason is simple and in line with our earlier results. A lower value of ft implies higher decreasing returns in food production, which amplifies the positive impact of training on wages. W ith training levels at subsistence higher in North, the wage difference between North and South increases and so does H accumulation over time (cf. Figure 4) . This also explains the difference in amplitude of the oscillations th at appear in the figure. W ith lower decreasing returns, the time paths of trained labour accumulation converge and oscillation periods overlap. The wage and price shocks th at occur in both countries therefore either reinforce or counter each other, affecting the amplitude of the swings in comparative advantage accordingly.
[insert Figure 5 about here]
The overall picture is also invariant to allowing for depreciation of trained labour. Arguably, skills acquired during training may wear out over time, implying th at trained labour may become unsuitable for producing manufac tures after a while. However, allowing for this possibility in our framework, for instance by assuming th at each period a certain percentage of the total trained labour force becomes untrained again, does not affect the analysis whatsoever. This is different when we allow for other increases in the un trained labour force, for instance exogenous population growth. Provided the (exogenous) untrained labour force growth exceeds the (endogenous) outflow into trained labour, a country may remain at subsistence forever. The reason is of course th at since the number of people working in agriculture does not decline, wages for untrained labour are depressed, which mitigates the room for training and depresses wages even further.19 In our analysis it is more likely th at the less fertile country remains at subsistence -the pressure on wages in agriculture is initially highest there. In that case also its compara tive advantage will remain in agricultural produce forever. In terms of Figure   5 : the upward sloping part disappears.20
Trade, p overty and d ev elo p m en t
In this section we discuss the consequences of our framework on the desirabil ity of trade liberalisation in the wake of poverty. As shown, poverty affects the development of countries, affecting their comparative advantages over time. The effects of trade liberalisation therefore depend on the time it takes place. We start with discussing the impact of trade development Starting with allocative efficiency, it is clear that trade is beneficial for both countries: the overall gains from trade are invariant to the reason for comparative advantage. However, it might be that global efficiency is served by preventing poverty to affect comparative advantage and trade patterns.
To see this, we note th at the switch away from nature-given comparative advantage is not efficient compared to a world where this switch had not oc curred. A conceivable alternative world in which the infertile country devel ops a larger industrial base and the fertile country specializes in agriculture, clearly would be able to achieve higher global output in both agricultural and manufactured goods. Food production taking place in fertile regions means th at the world is able to harbor a higher share of trained workers, so th at the number of manufacturing companies increase, bringing down costs of manufactures. In other words, given the circumstances there are advan tages in terms of allocative efficiency, but opening up to trade also affects the circumstances. W hether this is for the good depends on the timing of trade liberalization. Trade could help creating an alternative distribution of endowments th at is more efficient, but it is also possible that trade de lays or prevents reaching the most efficient distribution of endowments. How this works will become clear after discussing how trade affects comparative advantage and how this depends on the timing of trade liberalisation.
Comparative advantage changes with the development phase of a country.
Initially, North has a comparative advantage in agricultural products, which is in line with its nature-given comparative advantage. Due to N orth's faster industrialisation, however, its comparative advantage immediately shifts into manufacturing once training enters the analysis. In steady state though, N orth's comparative advantage is in food again. Qualitatively, trade does not affect this development pattern. Regardless of whether trade does or does not take place, the steady state, in which no more labour is trained, is always the same, determined by internal factors only.21 In the (very) long run, therefore, trade has no impact upon development and, for that m atter, the endowment distribution.
However, this does by no means imply that trade is irrelevant. Trade affects the income distribution and, by that, influences the speed of devel opment of countries. How exactly depends on the moment that trade liber alisation occurs. It turns out that the important distinction for developing an industrial base is between (1) liberalisation occurring before the southern region has achieved subsistence levels of income, (2) liberalisation occurring after the southern region has achieved subsistence levels of income, but with still a comparative advantage in agricultural goods, and (3) liberalisation occurring after the southern region has achieved subsistence levels of income and has returned to its nature-given comparative advantage in manufactured goods.
If trade occurs before the southern region has achieved subsistence levels of income (phase 1), it will tend to speed up the industrialisation processes sketched in the previous section. For this to take place it does not m atter when exactly during phase 1 trade is liberalised. Suppose, for instance, that there is free trade right from the start. Then North will start exporting agri cultural products and import industrial goods (and opposite for South)22. as trade in m anufactures will be of the intra-industry type. Hence, when we speak of specialization in production, we actually mean relative specialization. 23 Note th a t due to differences in fertility, comparative advantage will shift before the process of catching up is completed.
24This also holds true for the situation where North is above subsistence and South at subsistence levels of income, while South has a comparative advantage in agriculture. In th a t case, trade liberalisation increases training levels in both countries, boosting devel For the desirability of trade liberalisation, this has important implica tions. First, we note th at ultimate outcomes of development are not affected by trade, so th at these do not enter the evaluation of trade liberalisation. In other words, there are no strict 'lock-in' effects. Even if we would allow for exogenous population growth, with South's comparative advantage remain ing in agriculture forever, trade is not the reason for lock-in effects.25 W hat trade can do, however, is to affect the moment these ultimate, steady-state outcomes are achieved, either delaying it or advancing it. Second, we note th at the analysis lends some to the idea th at global efficiency might be served 25In fact, with population growth, trade may help South to escape subsistence levels of income, as it increases the room for training.
26 This seems to ignore any costs th a t could be involved in shifting from the povertyinduced to the nature-given state. As it can be argued th a t individuals would weigh these costs against the benefits of structural transform ation in their training decisions, including such costs would render the argum ent favouring tem porary protection null and void. However, price-taking individuals do not take into account the effects of training th at occur via changed global endowment distributions and specialization pattern. Individuals not taking into account these effects train less th an the optimal am ount from a social perspective.
T able 1: E ffects o f tr a d e o n th e p a ce o f in d u stria l d ev elo p m en t

North South
Phase 1: at subsistence negative positive 
C on clu sion
This paper has argued th at poverty is a crucial factor in assessing the desir ability of trade liberalisation for development. The basic argument we have 27We only use trade policy as intervention option for illustrative purposes. O ther forms of intervention might of course be preferable to trade policy, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess which policy constitutes a first-or second-best intervention to the problems we perceive. put forward is th at poverty limits people in their economic choices. Con fronted with a wage th at is hardly sufficient to survive, people are forced to supply all the labour time necessary for reaching a subsistence income. In this sense, deciding on one's labour inputs on basis of their preferences about various alternative uses of available time is a luxury th at poor people cannot afford.
The main effect of this observation is that in a context of poverty, higher wages will tend to limit labour supply and boost alternative uses of time, such as schooling. It follows th at countries whose population enjoys higher agricultural incomes will be able to invest more in training, and therefore develop faster. These aspects of poverty have been analysed in a formal set-up th at takes heed of these non-standard decision processes. It has been shown th at countries enjoying a nature-given comparative advantage in agriculture, for instance because of higher fertility of land, will develop a poverty-induced comparative advantage in manufacturing. Over time, however, as incomes rise and industrialisation takes hold in less advantaged regions as well, this pattern of comparative advantage will shift back again to its nature-given position.
Trade has no qualitative effect on these processes, but may either prolong or compress the period of poverty-induced comparative advantages. Depen dent on the specific phase of relative development of a country, it might be desirable to pass by on trade if one's goal is to industrialise as soon as pos sible. Our paper therefore supports the critique that poverty disqualifies the standard reasoning (in economics) th at free trade is typically good. Poverty has been shown to m atter, for both development and the resultant emergence of trade patterns. Dependent on the importance one attaches to dynamic in come effects, a temporary phase of protection might therefore be desirable for developing countries. Such temporary protectionist measures are however not benefiting the poorest countries. Opposition to free trade is principally in the interest of middle-income countries in the process of catching-up. This puts the collapse of trade talks in Cancun in a rather different light, since the opposing block of developing nations was led by precisely such middle-income countries. In terms of poverty alleviation, then, free trade is still optimal.
In the end, of course, the income effects of various policy alternatives need to be compared to assess the relevance and desirability of policy inter vention. We have not addressed this issue explicitly, but note th at whereas industrialisation raises incomes in the long(er) run, trade always brings direct beneficial effects, in terms of increased static allocative efficiency. In other words, the decision whether to open up to trade or not for a middle-income country while catching-up hinges on its particular trade-off between direct income effects and the desired speed of industrialisation. If a country puts a stronger emphasis on current income, trade is always beneficial. If, by contrast, a country is willing to sacrifice current gains from trade to achieve higher levels of income in future sooner, stalling free trade could be optimal.
For instance when trade liberalisation would prolong the state where povertyinduced comparative advantage pattern governs trade patterns. Because of poverty, countries seeking fast industrialisation and a rapid dissemination of dynamic income effects may want to temporarily stall the free movement of goods until comparative advantage has resumed its nature-given order.
If other countries have the same objective, conflicts of interest are likely to emerge. One might suspect that trade liberalisation becomes a very dif ficult exercise for this reason. On the other hand, also global efficiency may be served by stalling free trade. Global income levels will be high est when natural endowments determine comparative advantage and not poverty. In a world where poverty matters, our analysis shows th at there are instances where postponing trade liberalisation may serve poverty allevi ation and global efficiency at the same time. 
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